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Abstract: Following the initialling of the Vilnius Agreement from 28-29 November 2013, the Republic 
of Moldova seemed to have entered the path towards the European integration. The great failure for the 
Brussels’ leaders was, by far, the Ukraine’s refuse to sign the Association Agreement, a decision placed on 
the account of Moscow’s influence and which proved once more the fact that the relations between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation have grown increasingly confrontational over the Eastern 
Partnership’s countries. In the context of the unrests in Kiev at the beginning of 2014 and subsequently of 
the pro-Russian movements in the South and East of the Ukrainian state, the Republic of Moldova has 
acquired a special significance within the geopolitical situation of the region, being regarded as an outpost 
of what certain analysts already consider to be the “New Cold War”. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
27  November  2013  was  a  highly  significant  date  for  two  of  the  Eastern  Partnership’s 
members,  Georgia  and  the  Republic  of  Moldova.  On  that  day,  in  Vilnius,  Lithuania,  the 
representatives of the two states initialized the Vilnius Agreement, coming one step closer to the 
European Union. The great failure of the summit was Ukraine, the most important and advanced 
member of the Eastern Partnership, which was supposed to sign the Association Agreement but for 
reasons  widely  known  did  not.  The  process  of  re-defining  the  European  Union’s  Eastern 
neighbourhood  had  to  come  to  a  hold  as  the  unfortunate  events  in  Ukraine  and  the  Russian 
Federation’s involvement led the world to the edge of a conflict which might lead to a general 
destabilization of the situation within the South-East of Europe. 
 
1.  FOLLOWING  THE  EASTERN  PARTNERSHIP:  REPUBLIC  OF  MOLDOVA  – 
“LOST IN GEOPOLITICAL GAMES” 
 
At the beginning of 2014, an article signed by a freelance writer in Chişinău surprised the 
reality from this small state at the border of the European Union – “lost in geopolitical games” 
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(Corlăţeanu,  2014).  Less  visible  at  the  end  of 2013,  when  the  Ukrainian  crisis  had  arisen,  the 
strategic importance of the Republic of Moldova rapidly increased in the context of the Russian 
annexation of Crimea and the aggressive anti-Ukrainian attitude manifested by Moscow. A number 
of articles and analysis regarding the special position of the small former Soviet republic have 
already been issued and the situation seems to get even worse as the Russian Federation is not 
willing to step back in order to give up its influence within the territories that it once mastered. 
Under these circumstances the Transnistrian file acquired a new page as the leaders of the so-called 
Transnistrian Republic have already solicited the inclusion in Russia. The Crimean episode became 
the precedent they needed to invoke and the narrow strip of land became “the frontline in East-West 
struggle” as depicted in an article published in “Financial Times” (Oliver, 2014). 
A brief survey of the major interests in the region shows the followings: 
- the European Union needs the Republic of Moldova to firmly confirm its political option in order 
to prove not only that the Eastern Partnership was not a complete failure, but also to acquire a safe 
and certain partner in this region. 
- the United States of America are concerned with protecting their interests in South-Eastern Europe 
where  they  have  deployed  elements  of  the  anti-missile  shield,  an  action  which  has  been 
permanently contested by Russia. 
- the Russian Federation has a particular interest in keeping the Republic of Moldova under its 
influence as it strives to maintain its economic and political presence in order to secure the Eastern 
part of this state – Transnistria – a territory where Moscow constantly refused to withdraw its 
military forces from. In addition to this, President Vladimir Putin did not give up his master plan of 
creating the Eurasian Union and Ukraine was supposed to play a certain part in this strategy. 
 
2. THE WEST, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE “NEW APPEASEMENT” 
POLICY 
 
“History repeats itself” – this is one leitmotiv that seems to be in many people’s minds when 
thinking about the Ukrainian crisis and the way in which Vladimir Putin acts and endangers the 
international relations’ system. Yet history tends to repeat itself only when people learned nothing 
from previous experiences that put to test their will and capacity of response or the following 
generations simply forget or ignore the teachings of the past. 
Despite critics and contradictions, a number of analysts, specialists in international relations 
and politicians considered that Vladimir Putin’s actions surprisingly resemble Hitler’s during the  
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’30s, when the West’s capacity of defence and reaction was also put to test but failed to prove itself. 
Yet this aspect is more than worrying when taking into account not only the proper annexation of 
Crimea or the possibility of invading the East and South of Ukraine, but the fact that the Russian 
Federation shows complete disrespect regarding international treaties and obligations assumed by 
mutual  consent.  Combining  these  elements  and  the  rather  flexible  and  divided  attitude  of  the 
Western European powers one might even consider that we are dealing here with a new kind of 
appeasement,  in  certain  manners  similar  to  the  conciliator  attitude  that  Hitler  used  in  order  to 
achieve his purposes at the end of ’30s. Naturally, the general conditions and the international 
elements are now largely different, we have other major actors within the field of international 
relations and the Great Powers’ interests are considered mainly from a global perspective. However, 
the issue stands as it might lead to a reconfiguration of international spheres of influence and the 
balance of power might shift again. 
The above mentioned major actors (the United States of America, the European Union, the 
Russian  Federation)  –  to  which  one  must  necessarily  add  China  –  are  likely  to  confront  the 
necessity  of  redefining  the  coordinates  they  use  for  revealing  their  diplomatic  and  geopolitical 
games.  One  might  also  assist  to  a  very  interesting  change  of  economic  background  in  the 
eventuality of emerging the Eurasian Union – this will truly be a test especially for the economic 
capacity of the European Union, even if only considering the possibility that Russia will change its 
major economic targets and will focus primarily on the Asian connections with China and other 
states. 
Another conclusion can also be drawn from the recent events and has already been mentioned 
under various forms in a number of articles and analysis: “The premise of an international order 
defined by the West and shared by the rest has been shown to be faulty” (Janning, 2014). Under 
these terms entities like the Russian Federation, China, and quite likely certain emergent powers 
would definitely challenge the American and Western geopolitical supremacy. 
One of the questions that seem to preoccupy the thoughts of many analysts and Western 
politicians is “how far is Vladimir Putin willing to go?”, as it is more than clear that the Ukrainian 
crisis is at the same time a test and a possibility to prove that Russia has recovered after the Cold 
War and is trying to play again an important role in the international arena. Yet, from Europe’s 
perspective, the main question should be “how far is the European Union willing to let this situation 
go?”. It is true, however, that the instruments preferred and promoted by the leaders in Brussels – 
dialogue and negotiations – had no effect so far. Besides, let us not forget that the Eurasian Union 
projected by Vladimir Putin can and should be seen also as a strong reaction against the continuous  
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extending  European  Union  and  against  the  military  force  of  the  Occident,  NATO,  which  was 
permanently  regarded  in  Moscow  as  an  alliance  directed  specifically  against  Russia  (Janning, 
2014). 
In our opinion, it is more than a question of territorial gains for the Russian Federation within 
the space of the former Soviet Union. The main issue is that Vladimir Putin and a large part of the 
Russian political elites wish to retake the position held by Moscow before the collapse in 1991 and 
the unfortunate events in Ukraine represent only a phase of this attempt.  
 
3. THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION – A VITAL PROJECT FOR THE REPUBLIC 
OF MOLDOVA AND THE POLITICAL ELITES IN CHIŞINĂU 
 
Within the current geopolitical and economic background, the Republic of Moldova is but one 
of the strategic points of the European continent. Due to the fact that its Eastern part – Transnistria – 
represents a key-point for the Russian influence in the region, the Republic of Moldova unwittingly 
became  a  sort  of  “no  man’s  land”,  a  political  entity  which  seems  to  have  already  chosen  the 
direction it should follow: West. Nevertheless, things are not so simple. 
Were we to use a word game, the Republic of Moldova is rather doomed to deal only with 
Unions: escaped from the former Soviet Union, it hopes and prepares to become a part of the 
European Union, despite the fact that a number of its citizens would prefer to be members of the 
Customs  Union  (the  future  Eurasian  Union).  Following  the  events  in  April  2009,  when  the 
communist leadership was removed, the government in Chişinău repeatedly proved its desire of 
European integration as this is the only possible way not only for completely breaking up with the 
Soviet past, but also for the very existence of the state. As a consequence, there were certain periods 
when a very aggressive European discourse was promoted in order to emphasize this aspect, but 
also to avoid the frontal approach of other very sensitive matters like the identity of the Republic of 
Moldova’s citizens or the possibility of territorial disintegration if the Transnistrian side of the state 
would actually decide that and would be backed by Russia. 
The efforts of the leaders in Chişinău are continuously contested by the former holders of the 
power, the communists and their supporters. It is not a secret that the Russian propaganda is very 
strong in the Republic of Moldova despite the fact that the idea of European integration has already 
become a common place for the public opinion. Russian TV channels and Russian newspapers and 
magazines practically dominate the media background within the former Soviet republic. Although 
the official language is Romanian or, as most politicians in Chişinău like to say, Moldavian, and  
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there is also an official decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova regarding 
this aspect in December 2013, the Russian language continues to play an important role in many 
citizens’ everyday life. Nevertheless one must not forget the fact that the communist inheritance is 
still very strong especially when thinking about the mentality of the population, a fact which clearly 
represents an obstacle when we try to understand certain features of the Moldavian political stage. 
During the last two years, as the efforts and preoccupations of the government for acquiring a 
real perspective of European integration have increasingly grown, the Communists’ Party and their 
allies promoted their own goals trying to counterbalance the pro-European campaign. One of the 
subjects of this truly anti-European integration offensive refers to the benefits that would result for 
the Republic of Moldova if the state became a part of the Customs Union (the future Eurasian 
Union). Especially after the summit in Vilnius the articles and various manifestations against the 
European integration and also against the Romanian identity became even more numerous than 
before. For instance, in spite of its alleged adversity towards the Communists’ Party, the Socialists’ 
Party in Moldova conducts a vigorous press campaign against the European idea and in favour of 
the Customs Union. Slogans like За таможенный союз!(For the Customs Union!), Молдаване – 
не  румыны!(Moldavians  –  not  Romanians!),  or  Люблю  Молдову(I  love  Moldova)  can  be 
frequently met in most issues of the periodical entitled “The Socialists”. 
All international observers and analysts agreed that in the Republic of Moldova the division 
between  the  citizens  wishing  closer  ties  with  the  Russian  Federation  and  those  choosing  the 
European way is really sharp. Many of the first are easy to manipulate and indoctrinate, as their way 
of thinking was practically deformed during the long Soviet period. This twisted way of seeing 
things  is  just  one  of  the  features  that  characterize  the  true  wicked  and  poisoned  communist 
inheritance which can be met within the Republic of Moldova. 
The whole of the aspects presented here combined with the fact that the country will face 
parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2014 which could still bring an unwanted victory for the 
Communists’ Party contribute to the underlining of a rather complex and delicate situation which 
fully necessitates the attention of the decisional factors of the European Union. It is also quite clear 
that  a  communist-led  Republic  of  Moldova  might  turn  sooner  or  later  from  an  Association 
Agreement with the European Union to a possible membership in the Customs Union – the future 
Eurasian Union (Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2014, p. 41). 
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4. THE OTHER WAY – THE UNION WITH ROMANIA 
 
Following the initialling of the Vilnius Agreement from November 2013 by the Moldavian 
Prime Minister Iurie Leancă, the Romanian President Traian Băsescu brought to public discussion 
the idea of a project regarding the unification of the two states, Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova.  The  reactions  and  statements  of  the  political  leaders  in  Chişinău  are  widely  known, 
practically denying any intention of union with Romania and emphasizing the fact that there is a 
Moldavian identity and a Moldavian nation. The situation was not new at all. After the events in 
April 2009, when plans and ideas of unification had again begun to flourish, the attitude of the 
Moldavian  politicians  was  also  quite  clear  in  this  regard,  a  new  version  of  the  so-called 
“Moldovenist  doctrine”  coming  to  life  step-by-step.  Those  who  are  not  familiarized  with  the 
historical and political background in the Republic of Moldova might consider rather contradictory 
and more than surprising the fact that the democratic forces leading nowadays the neighbouring 
state  have  fully  assumed  and  promoted  a  Soviet  inspired  thesis  previously  sustained  by  their 
political opponents, the communists and their allies. Yet the contradiction is only apparent. Such an 
attitude was and will probably be a permanent feature of the Moldavian diplomacy as long as the 
identity project named  Republic of Moldova will stand and as long as in Chişinău will exist a 
political elite unwilling to give up its prerogatives and privileges in order to integrate in another 
state – Romania – where it will not have any guaranties for maintaining the positions it has now. 
Besides, one must note that this issue of the more or less formally rejection of Romania has become 
a constant within the leading circles in Chişinău regardless of their political colour. It would be 
interesting to see how these leading circles would react if the so-called Moldavian statality was 
really endangered. 
According to one of the most authorized Romanian analysts of these issues, namely Dan 
Dungaciu, former councillor of the Moldavian ex-president Mihai Ghimpu, one can talk about a 
true syndrome of the political elites in the Republic of Moldova, metaphorically named the “too 
much Romania” syndrome (Dungaciu, 2013). The idea was developed in an article published in the 
summer of 2013. The author did not state any conclusions, he simply acknowledged the syndrome 
in question which is closely connected with the so-called “European Moldovenism”, having some 
very interesting implications for the identity project Republic of Moldova. 
After  the  euphoria  of  initialling  the  Vilnius  Agreement,  many  have  noticed  with 
dissatisfaction and concern that the formulations and expressions chosen for the final statement in 
Vilnius were very prudent and moderate as there was no reference to two issues of major interest  
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for the government in Chişinău: the frozen conflicts (with immediate reference to Transnistria) and 
Article 49 of the European Union’s Treaty which provides the clear possibility of accession. Thus, 
in the eventuality of a more difficult European way both for internal and external reasons (such as 
the need to implement  certain reforms, the connection to the European Union’s standards, and 
various pressures and interferences from the East), it would be again interesting to see to what 
extent the identity project and the European one will hold – the two major Moldavian projects 
promoted by the democratic politicians in  Chişinău. The real  endangering of one of these two 
projects could automatically lead to endangering the other, having as a final result the questioning 
of the perspectives of the state Republic of Moldova. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The international  context  at  the beginning of 2014 and the clashes  of  the Great  Powers’ 
interests in South-Eastern Europe and particularly in Ukraine do not contribute in any way to the 
shaping of a calm and peaceful climate within the former Soviet entity Republic of Moldova. Both 
at the level of political stage and the population, the state continues to be divided between the two 
options – West (European Union) and East (Customs Union and implicitly the Russian Federation). 
A  complex  of  internal  and  external  factors  also  plays  an  important  role  when  discussing  the 
hesitations and the duplicitous attitude which sometimes characterized the actions of the politicians 
in Chişinău within the last five years. Nevertheless, nobody can deny that the political forces that 
got  the  power  after  April  2009  have  done  much  in  order  to  come  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
European Union and try to take the Republic of Moldova out of the so-called “grey zone” in which 
the state finds itself because of the situations in Transnistria and Găgăuzia and because of the 
pressures exerted by the Russia (Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2014, p. 44). Yet, the closest date 
mentioned for the desired integration in the European Union is year 2019. As an Eastern neighbour 
of the European Union and a former Soviet republic, Moldova has only a few options. One of the 
moments that will show which way its citizens decide to go is represented by the elections in the 
autumn of 2014. The context  might  complicate depending on the situation in  Ukraine and the 
attitude of the Russian Federation. Things might get even worse if thinking at the possibility of the 
direct access of Moscow in the Transnistrian region or in the Southern part of Ukraine. However, 
the unwanted case of the dismemberment of Ukraine and the Russian presence will put the Republic 
of Moldova, the European Union and Romania in a very delicate dilemma: if Europe does not want 
to lose Moldova, and if the Moldavian citizens truly desire to become members of the European  
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Union and to completely break up with the Soviet past, this might lead to a way which seems to be 
at  the  same  time  the  fastest  but  also  the  most  problematic,  because  of  the  international 
entanglements and discontents – the unification with Romania. 
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